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In his paper in this Issue, ‘ “How do Mādhyamikas Think?” Revisited’, Tom 
Tillemans reflects on his paper “How do Mādhyamikas Think?” (2009), itself a reply 
to earlier work of ours (Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest 2008, Garfield and Priest 2003). 
There is much we agree with in these non-dogmatic and open-minded papers. Still, 
we have some disagreements. We begin with a response to Tillemans’ first thoughts, 
and then turn to his second thoughts. 
1. Tillemans’ First Thoughts 
In (2009) Tillemans maintains that it is wrong to attribute to Nāgārjuna or to 
his Mādhyamika followers strong dialetheism, according to which some 
contradictions of the form p∧¬p are to be accepted. He argues that, nonetheless, a 
weak dialetheism may be implicit in the Prajñāpāramitā literature and in pre-
Dignāga/Dharmakīrti Madhyamaka.  A weak dialetheism, on this understanding, 
would be non-adjunctive: There might be some pairs of sentences, p and ¬p, that are 
accepted, but their conjunction is nonetheless not accepted. 
Before considering this suggestion, let us review the three contradictions to 
which we argue Madhyamaka is committed, and their grounds:1 
1. (The semantic paradox) There are no ultimate truths and it is 
ultimately true that everything is empty. There is no ultimate reality 
(distinct from conventional reality). Ultimate truth is the truth about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  We thank Kyoto University for support for the symposium on Contradictions in Buddhism (2012) and 
the members of that symposium, especially Mark Siderits, Brook Zipporyn, Koji Tanaka and Takashi 
Yagisawa and Shoryu Katsura for critical response. We also thank Constance Kassor and an audience 
at the American Academy of Religion meeting in San Francisco for critical response to our work and 
Tom Tillemans for his sustained critical engagement with our view. Jay Garfield and Graham Priest 
also thank the Australian Research Council for support for this research. Thanks to Rebecca Alexander 
for editorial assistance.	  
1 Priest and Garfield (2003) describe 1 and 3 under the same rubric. We now think they are best 
distinguished. 
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such a reality. Ultimate reality provides the truth-makers of such 
claims. Therefore there is no ultimate truth. But there is at least one 
ultimate truth, viz., that everything is empty. 
2. (The ontological paradox) Things have no nature, and that is their 
nature. To be empty is to be empty of intrinsic properties. Everything 
is empty, and so has no intrinsic properties. But: something is an 
intrinsic property of x iff it would have it even if x were the only thing 
in existence. Therefore being empty is an intrinsic property. For being 
empty is part of something’s nature (essence) and so it would have it 
whenever it existed.  
3. (The expressibility paradox) There are no ultimate truths; but 
there are, e.g., that is one.  Ultimate reality is non-dual. One can’t, 
therefore, apply concepts to it. So it is ineffable. But one can say things 
about it (e.g., in explaining why it is ineffable) so there are ultimate 
truths. 
The argument that such contradictions are to be found in the Madhyamaka 
tradition are partly textual. Tillemans grants that many passages in the Madhyamaka 
sūtra and śāstra corpus at least appear to express these thoughts. Of course, how to 
interpret these passages is contentious; we certainly do not deny the possibility of 
other interpretations (though we do claim that ours is the most coherent). The 
argument is not merely textual, however, and indeed even were we to grant that 
alternative readings of the relevant texts according to which they are not 
endorsements of explicit contradictions are preferable, we would stand by our claim 
that Madhyamaka is inconsistent. We argue that Mādhymikas ought to endorse these 
contradictions since they follow from fundamental Madhyamaka doctrines.  The 
arguments we sketched briefly above are developed at greater length in Garfield and 
Priest (op. cit.)   
Tillemans does not take issue with our understanding of the Madhyamaka 
doctrines or the fact that these entail contradictions – though he does so in his second 
thoughts, and we turn to this below. Instead, he argues that there is more general 
evidence that Mādhyamikas rejected any contradiction of the form p∧¬p. He offers 
two principal arguments. The first concerns the use made of the catuṣkoṭi by 
Nāgārjuna  in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK). Prima facie, the presence of the third 
koṭi suggests that  dialetheism would appear to be a live possibility for Nāgārjuna and 
his followers. As Tillemans points out, however, there are important passages in 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā where Nāgārjuna appears to reject all four possibilities. A 
fortiori, in these passages, he rejects the third koṭi. And when he does, his 
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commentators sometimes claim that he does so on the strength of the law of non-
contradiction. (e.g. Tsongkhapa 2006, p. 227) 
The matter requires more careful consideration, however. The leitmotif of 
MMK is that everything is empty (śūnya), that nothing has svabhāva. Each chapter	  is	  devoted	  to	  arguing	  that something one might take to be a candidate for having 
svabhāva,	  in	  fact	  necessarily	  lacks	  it.	  Some	  chapters	  (I,	  VIII,	  XII)	  begin	  by	  taking	  as	  a	  hypothesis	  for	  reductio	  the	  assumption	  that	  something,	  x,	  has	  svabhāva	  	  (that	  is,	  that	  is	  has	  ultimate	  existence).	  	  The	  failure	  of	  each	  limb	  of	  the	  catuṣkoṭi	  is	  then	  demonstrated	  to	  follow.	  A reductio of the original assumption – that x	  has	  
svabhāva – is then inferred.	  (See Priest 2010)	  	  In	  each	  of	  these	  cases, however, the third koṭi is rejected in the context of x 
having svabhāva. It is an object with svabhāva that cannot have contradictory 
properties. The text provides no evidence that this can be generalised to all objects. 
The position is quite compatible with empty things having contradictory properties. 
And the DGP contradictions concern empty things. Moreover, in each of these cases, 
not only is the third koṭi rejected, but all four koṭis are rejected. If Tillemans’ textual 
argument were sound, it would hence prove too much: not only would contradictions 
be rejected by Mādhyamikas, all assertions would be. And we would be back to 
paradox very quickly. 
Tillemans’ second argument can be dealt with more quickly. This argument 
concerns the way that totality (the whole, the cosmos, sarva) is discussed in the 
Madhyamaka tradition. He argues that there is no evidence to suggest that it was 
thought of as contradictory,  and in fact that there is direct evidence that they did not 
so conceive it. This is, however, beside the point.  The contradictions that DGP 
ascribe to Madhyamaka are limit contradictions. Garfield and Priest (2003) show that 
they fit the Inclosure Schema, which shows how the contradictions arise at the limits 
of certain totalities (such as the totality of the things expressible).  The totalities 
involved in the Inclosure Scheme are not, in general, absolute, the one which 
Tillemans considers. The contradictions occur, not at the limit of absolutely 
everything, but at the limits of everything of a certain kind (e.g, the things that can be 
expressed). In fact, the best way to think of the Inclosure Schema is not as a principle 
about totalities at all, but as a principle about boundaries. Contradictions arise at 
boundaries of certain kinds. (The things within a boundary obviously form a totality 
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of a certain kind.)  If there is an explicit discussion of boundaries in the Madhyamaka 
tradition, and in particular, one that asserts their consistency, we do not know of it, 
and Tillemans certainly does not adduce one.  So, neither of the arguments against our 
view in Tillemans (2009) is compelling. 
Let us turn now to the weak, or non-adjunctive, form of dialetheism Tillemans 
ascribes to Madhyamaka. He is less impressed by the argument we mount than by the 
frequent and explicit contradictions of the kind to be found in the Vajracchedikā and 
other Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras. These are instances of the so-called “signature formula” 
of the Vajracchedikā, statements of the form a is F because a is not F. It is easy, and 
standard, to disambiguate these statements. a is F conventionally because a is not F 
ultimately.  
We concur with Tillemans that, as a general hermeneutical principle, it is 
better to interpret texts straight, without interpolating words; we also agree that this 
principle admits of exceptions (while disagreeing, perhaps about where those 
exceptions lie). In the case of the Vaj signature formulae, the disambiguation we 
suggest is natural, coheres with much other Buddhist thought, and is well-supported 
by commentarial literature.  Attractive as the Vajracchedikā might be to dialetheists at 
first sight, we therefore suggest that it be put to one side. 
The point at issue, though, is Tillemans’ claim that any Madhyamaka 
dialetheism is weak dialetheism. We think that if there are contradictions here, these 
should be interpreted in a conjunctive sense – even if the text does not make this 
explicit. First, note that in contemporary English as well as in classical Greek, 
Sanskrit, and Tibetan, native speakers do not distinguish between consecutive 
assertions of p and q, and a single assertion of their conjunction. ‘I got up and made 
breakfast’ means much the same as ‘I got up. I made breakfast’. 
Moreover, weak dialetheism entails the rejection of the logical principle of 
adjunction: p, q |-  p∧q. There are non-adjunctive logics, but they involve a highly 
unusual interpretation of conjunction.2	   And it is reasonable to say that if a connective 
does not satisfy adjunction, it is not really conjunction at all. Moreover, there is 
certainly no independent evidence that any Indian logician—Mādhyamika or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For details of these logics and their history, see Priest (2007). 
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otherwise—ever proposed a non-adjunctive logic. Tillemans presents no evidence that 
the attribution of such an account of conjunction is hermeneutically plausible in this 
case or in any other Indian case.3  We conclude that weak dialetheism is a non-starter.  
Madhyamaka is either strongly dialethic or not dialethic at all.  In this case, ironically, 
there is no middle path! 
Finally, turning, from conjunction to negation, Tillemans says that we can 
avoid dialethic readings of apparent contradictions by taking it that we have 
statements of the form p and ¬p, the second can be thought of as doing nothing but 
“cancelling out” the first. Consecutive assertions of the contradictory statements could 
therefore be seen as a way of expressing the Madhyamaka claim that all substantial 
views about reality are to be rejected.  Now, the thought that asserting ¬p cancels out 
an assertion of p – as opposed to merely adding more information – is a view of 
negation that, though known in the West, has been highly heterodox since about the 
13th Century. (Priest 1999) This of course, does not settle the point, as we are talking 
about classical Indian, not modern Western logic. It does however, locate the 
exegetical burden of proof. We need a hermeneutical argument that there is reason to 
interpret negation as a cancellation operator in Indian logic. Tillemans does not 
provide this in (2009) —though he does so, as we shall see, in the present volume. We 
emphasize here only that this burden must be borne if consecutive  apparently 
contradictory assertions are to be read as Tillemans suggests in this last desperate 
attempt to salvage a consistent reading of these passages. 
2.  Tillemans’ Second Thoughts 
 
We now come to Tillemans’ arguments in this volume.  We begin by 
acknowledging many points of agreement: 
 
• We agree that Buddhist thought in general, and Madhyamaka thought in 
particular, evolves considerably in the 1000 or so years after Nāgārjuna. (How 
could it be otherwise?)  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In fn. 16, Tillemans raises the question of the validity of the law of double negation in Indian logic. 
As far as the distinction between strong and weak dialetheism goes, this is irrelevant. Adjunction will 
validate the inference ¬p, ¬¬p |-  ¬p∧¬¬p; and the conclusion is a conjoined contradiction, even 
without the law of double negation. 
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• And though we and Tillemans might interpret particular thinkers differently, 
we also agree that dialetheic tendencies in Madhyamaka thought are at their 
strongest is its earlier years, and wane under the influence of the logic of 
Dharmakīrti and Dignāga, with its endorsement of the Principle of Non-
Contradiction.   
 
• We agree that it is always possible to interpret a dialetheic text consistently by 
parameterisation (a process of drawing distinctions), and that many later 
Madhyamaka thinkers were inclined to go down this route.  
 
• We also agree that it would be overkill to interpret all paradoxical utterances 
in Buddhist texts as dialetheic.4 
 
• We also agree that Candrakīrti and a host of his successors explicitly urge that 
contradictions are never to be endorsed, and that any dialethic reading must 
account for these assertions. We accept this dialectical burden. 
 
• And we agree that many Tibetan commentators including Tsongkhapa and 
Gorampa explicitly worked to “defuse” the apparent contradictions to which 
we advert, and so that it is incumbent upon us both to explain their 
commitment to defusing them and to explain why we think they failed and are 
better off for that failure.  We accept this dialectical burden as well. 
 
• Finally, we absolutely agree with Tillemans that to nail down the case for a 
dialethic reading requires us to demonstrate some ‘systemic advantage for the 
Buddhist – and not only for modern dialetheist philosophy’ (p. 3, his italics). 
We concur, and we cheerfully accept that dialectical burden as well as the 
previous two.  
 
We disagree regarding two central issues. First, while Tillemans seeks to find 
a systemic advantage for weak dialetheism in the service of a quietist reading of 
Nāgārjuna, we see a systemic advantage in a strong dialetheic interpretation of certain 
contradictions. We argue that the  contradictions we identify are neither arbitrary, nor 
capricious, nor instrumental. Instead, they are the consequences of core Buddhist, or 
at least Madhyamaka, views. One can avoid them by all sorts of fancy footwork, but 
the cost of doing so is to gut the original insights. This is the systemtic advantage we 
see.  
Compare a similar case from Western philosophy. Anyone who reads Hegel 
with eyes open sees that his views are explicitly dialetheic. (Priest 2007) This has not 
prevented subsequent commentators, especially in Anglo-American traditions, from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 That, indeed, was the point of Deguchi, Garfield and Priest (2009). 
Jay Garfield   5/18/12 4:30 PM
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trying to interpret him consistently.5 Even if the result of such a misreading of the text 
is coherent and interesting, the view that emerges is not Hegel’s: central and crucial 
aspects of his thought have been destroyed. So it is with Nāgārjuna and the 
Madhyamaka ideas he launched.  This is as substantial a ‘payoff’ (p. 3) for Buddhist 
philosophy as one could wish. 6 
With this in mind. Let us return to our three arguments. In the semantic and 
expressibility contradictions, half of the contradiction is that there are some ultimate 
truths: one such is that everything is empty. That everything is empty is the 
cornerstone of Madhyamaka. This is the central thesis of MMK: no Mādhyamika is 
going to deny this. But it is obviously not a conventional truth. Conventional reality 
appears full of things with svabhāva. That is why those who can see only this get it so 
wrong. Since it is not a conventional truth, it is an ultimate truth. That is the only 
other kind. 
The reason for the other half of the contradiction is different in these two 
cases. To get the semantic contradiction we take Candrakīrti’s insight that there is no 
ultimate reality distinct from conventional reality. Ultimate reality, if there were one, 
would be that which has svabhāva. There is no such thing.  Since there is no ultimate 
reality, there is not truth about it. To reject this argument one would appear to have to 
accept that some things have svabhāva. No Mādhyamika can accept this.  
The reason for the other half of the contradiction in the expressibility paradox, 
is given by those who endorse the existence of an ultimate reality, such as Gorampa.7  
For them, it is the very mark of ultimate reality that it is what remains after all 
conceptual/linguistic overlay has been removed. By very construction, then, one can 
say nothing of it. It is ineffable. Anything one can say truly must be a conventional 
truth. There is no ultimate truth. The only way to balk at this argument is to reject the 
thought that anything expressible in language is a conceptual construction, a 
conventional reality. But again, this is to deny a central Buddhist insight.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For references and discussion, see Priest (1989-90). 
6 Tillemans quotes us as saying that the contradictions in the relevant texts cannot be defused, and 
takes issue with this (p. 3). Of course, they can be defused in the way that the contradictions in Hegel’s 
thought can be. As should now be clear, this is not what we had in mind.  
7 Whether they can do this without attributing it svabhāva is a matter we will return to in connection 
with the ontological paradox. We turn to Gorampa’s views per se in our reply to Kassor in this volume. 
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An extra feature of this argument is that it provides us with another reason for 
supposing that there are ultimate truths, the other half of the contradiction. If we are to 
take seriously the argument that ultimate reality is ineffable, then this must refer to it. 
To do anything else is to change the subject. Since we can say true things about the 
ultimate, there are ultimate truths. 
Before we move to the ontological paradox, let us pause to see what Tillemans 
says about these arguments.  He suggest that one may try to avoid the contradiction 
involved by enforcing the distinction between ultimate truth and ultimate reality 
(existence) (p. 2). It is true that truth (satya/bden pa) and reality (satya/bden pa) are 
not distinguished very much in Indian and Tibetan literature. And indeed, paying 
attention to the difference may defuse Siderits’ famous and apparent contradictory 
slogan ‘The ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth’ (the ultimate truth is that 
there is no ultimate reality). However, the distinction is irrelevant for the arguments 
we have just discussed: we have observed this distinction meticulously in the above 
explanation of the contradictions (if in doubt, please read over the passage again to 
check), and Tillemans never charges us with an instance of this confusion. 
With regard specifically to the argument concerning the ineffable, Tillemans 
suggests that the problem is dissolved if we reject an account of language as mirroring 
reality (a sort of correspondence view of truth), and see it instead in some other way 
(‘being simply causally connected with things’, p. 2). This, frankly, is beside the 
point. If something is ineffable you can’t talk about it. Period. It doesn’t matter how 
language works. However it works, it constructs the conventional: the ultimate 
transcends this.8  
Let us now consider the ontological paradox. Half of the contradiction here is 
that nothing has intrinsic reality (svabhāva). As we have observed, no Mādhyamika 
can reject this. The other half of the contradiction is that it is of the intrinsic nature of 
things to be empty. So things do have an intrinsic nature. 9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Tillemans also notes the possibility of interpreting ineffability as the claim that there are some things 
that cannot be said about the ultimate. This is consistent with there being lots of things that can be said. 
This seems to us to give the game away. If there are some things that can be said about ultimate reality, 
it’s not really ineffable.  
9 In particular, then, if there is an ineffable ultimate reality, it does have an intrinsic nature: being 
empty. But this is a fate that is shares with everything else.  
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We can imagine a desperate strategy to avoid this paradox. It might be 
suggested that, though it is in the nature of things to be empty, this is not an intrinsic 
nature. But what is intrinsic nature? A property, P, is in the intrinsic nature of an 
object, x, iff x’s possession of P depends on nothing else.  Crudely, in a world where 
there was nothing but x, it would still be P.  But consider such a world (it may even be 
an impossible world). Since everything else has gone out of existence, x has no parts, 
and there is has nothing with which x can causally interact. So the being of x does not 
depend on these things. However, x is still one thing: it still has the property of unity. 
What x is, therefore, does depend on certain properties (concepts)—at least the 
property of unity. So in the world in question, it is still empty. So emptiness is the 
intrinsic nature of anything that exists. To exist is to be empty, and this is precisely 
why, as Nāgārjuna says in MMK XXIV: 19 that no non-empty thing exists!10 
The only obvious way to contest this argument is, again, to say that 
dependence for identity on concepts does not make something empty. And again no 
Mādhyamika is going to say this. 
Again, let us see what Tillemans has to say about this argument. He points out 
(p. 2) that the notion of svabhāva can be understood in many ways. Indeed, it can. But 
merely noting an ambiguity does not solve a paradox: it makes matters potentially 
worse! Corresponding to each disambiguation we have an argument; and one or more 
of these may be paradoxical!  So it is in this case. We have explained the sense of 
svabhāva we have in mind; it is absolutely the standard sense employed in 
Madhyamaka discussions of emptiness.  And we have been at pains to use the notion 
consistently in this sense in spelling out the argument. 
At this point it makes sense to address Tillemans’ challenging hermeneutical 
argument. As he notes, Candrakīrti does say in Prasannapadā: 
But if the opponent did not desist even when confronted with a 
contradiction (virodha) in his own position, then too, as he would have 
no shame, he would not desist at all even because of a logical reason 
and example. Now, as it is said, for us there is no debate with someone 
who is out of his mind. (Quoted in Tillemans, this issue p. 000) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 One might at this point cite Candrakīrti’s famous example in Pransannapadā in his commentary to 
MMK XIII: 8, in which he compares someone who would take emptiness—which is the lack of any 
intrinsic nature—to be itself an intrinsic nature to someone who, upon hearing that he shopkeeper has 
nothing to sell, asks to buy some of that nothing. But this would not help. It gets at only one side of the 
contradiction. We agree that emptiness is, as Candrakīrti so forcefully emphasizes, the absence of any 
intrinsic nature. It is also, however, an intrinsic nature. 
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And, as Tillemans notes, pronouncements like this are common in Indian and in 
Tibetan Buddhist literature ever since the rise of the new logic deriving from Nyāya, 
but brought into Buddhist discourse by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.  There are, as 
Tillemans suggests, two ways to read this statement.  On the one hand, we could read 
it as an ad hominen or prāsaṅga directed at an opponent who insists on consistency, 
even if Candrakīrti himself does not. On this reading, this remark does not tell at all 
against our account. Tillemans grants this. 
On the other hand, we concur with Tillemans that this is not the most natural 
reading of this pronouncement, or indeed of most of its cousins in the tradition.  
Nonetheless, we disagree that this shows that the contradictions are not real, and this 
for two reasons.  First, as Tillemans concedes, this  explicit disavowal of 
contradiction emerges in the Indian context long after the composition of the 
Madhyamaka roots texts of Nāgārjuna and after the composition of 
the ̛Prajñāparamitā sutras to which they respond.  Even if these later commentators 
disavow inconsistency the inconsistency we locate in those texts, and in East Asian 
Buddhism would remain, unless these consistent readings were to succeed. We return 
to this matter below. 
Second, explicit avowal of consistency does not consistency guarantee.  After 
all, many Western philosophers have claimed consistency despite being committed to 
theories that are manifestly inconsistent. We might mention Cantor, Russell and 
Tarski among others. (See Priest 2002 for details.) It is one thing to believe that 
consistency as a virtue, and to believe that one’s theory displays that virtue; quite 
another for it to be a virtue, or to be displayed by one’s theory. We grant that 
Candrakīrti and his fellow successors of Dignāga were in the thrall of a commitment 
to consistency. We deny that the achieved it, or that doing so would have been a good 
thing.  For Tillemans to demonstrate that Madhyamaka (at least after Candrakīrti) is 
consistent, he would have to show not that Candrakīrti believes it to be so, but that it 
is; for him to show that it is better for being consistent, he would have to demonstrate 
the virtues of consistency. We believe he has done neither. 
Finally, Tillemans points out that many post-Candrakīrti Indian and Tibetan 
exegetes have been at pains to “defuse” the apparent contradictions in 
Madhyamaka—indeed the very three that we emphasize.  Thus he says, “the three 
“paradoxes” DGP mention were defused regularly and often in very intelligent 
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fashions by Indo-Tibetan thinkers.” (Tillemans, this issue p 000) And he points out 
that  we ought  
instead of claiming that some would-be contradiction in a text simply 
cannot be defused, show that there is a substantial benefit for a 
particular Buddhist philosophical system if the text is read as tolerating 
inconsistency. In effect, we need to argue for significant systemic 
advantages for Mādhyamika Buddhists (and not only for a modern 
dialetheist philosophy building on the recurrence of inclosure schemas 
in both the East and the West). (Tillemans, this issue p. 000) 
We take ourselves to have done just this. To attempt to defuse contradictions, and 
even to be convinced that one has done so, even “in very intelligent fashion” is not to 
have done so.  Once again, we grant the historical point: many great exegetes take 
themselves to have demonstrated that the contradictions we locate are not actually 
contradictions. But we have shown that they are and that the defusings are, and must 
be, failures. And once again, we accept that our task is to demonstrate “systematic 
advantages for Mādhyamika Buddhists” from embracing them. We take ourselves to 
have done so. 
We now move to our second main disagreement with Tillemans. He seeks to 
find a systemic advantage for weak dialetheism in the service of a quietist reading of 
Nāgārjuna. Specifically, he argues, asserting ¬p after asserting p does not add more 
information, but serves instead to cancel commitment to p while not committing to 
¬p. 
Now, we do not subscribe to a (merely) quietist reading of Nāgārjuna. Nor 
could we, since we take him to be endorsing certain things: viz., at least, some 
paradoxical claims.11 But let that pass for the moment. The contradiction could 
function in the way Tillemans envisages only if negation really can be a cancellation 
operator in Indian logic. In our comments on his first thoughts, we noted that this 
reading requires a defense. Tillemans has now provided this, and we do not wish to 
contest it here.  For even given this reading, Tillemans does not present a case for 
weak, as opposed to strong, dialetheism. This is because, on an account of negation as 
cancellation, p∧¬p is self-cancelling: the first conjunct cancels the second, and the 
second the first. Typically, in logics that endorse this sort of account of negation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Nāgārjuna may deny all dṛṣṭi (views to the effect that certain things have svabhāva) but not all 
darśana (views, period). 
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p∧¬p has zero content. It entails nothing—not p, not ¬p.  (Priest 1999) This is not 
even weak dialetheism, although it is an even better way of enforcing an appropriate 
quietism!  
What Tillemans really needs is a story about conjunction: one according to 
which there is a difference between asserting p and ¬p severally and conjointly. An 
account of negation as cancellation does not provide this. Negation as cancellation is 
quite compatible with conjunction functioning in the familiar way. (Priest, Ibid.)  
Tillemans does present three fairly swift arguments for interpreting 
conjunction in a non-adjunctive fashion (p. 4). The first is that we do not find explicit 
contradictions of the form p∧¬p in the relevant texts. This may be true, but first, as 
we observed above: in practice, there is no intuitive difference between asserting p∧q, 
and asserting p and q seriatim, and so this is not to the point. Secondly, we are 
arguing that Mādhyamika’s should endorse these explicit contradictions, regardless of 
whether they do, because Madhyamaka is committed to them.  
The second is that conjoined contradictions are rejected in applications of the 
catuṣkoṭi. We have already answered this objection as well. The conjoined 
contradictions that are rejected are only those concerning objects with svabhāva, and 
in that context everything is reject, not just conjoined contradictions, leaving no 
special argument against contradiction or adjunction for that matter.  
The third reason is that ‘this is tantamount to having a very definite (quasi-
Hegelean) position on how things are’. This is not an objection to our view: it is our 
view. We are not quietists – though as far as the paradox of the expresibility goes, it 




Deguchi, Y., Garfield, J., and Priest, G. (2008), ‘The Way of the Dialetheist: 
Contradictions in Buddhism’, Philosophy East and West 58: 395-402. 
Garfield, J., and Priest, G. (2003), ‘Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought', Philosophy 
East West 53: 1-21. The essay appears as ch. 5 of Garfield’s, Empty Words, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; and ch. 16 of Priest’s Beyond the 
Limits of Thought, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Priest, G. (1980-90), ‘Dialectic and Dialetheic’, Science and Society 53: 388-415. 
	   13	  
Priest, G. (1999), ‘Cancellation as Negation’, Topoi 18: 141-8. 
Priest, G. (2007), ‘Paraconsistency and Dialetheism’, pp. 129-204, Vol. 8 of D. 
Gabbay and J. Woods (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic, Amsterdam: 
North Holland. 
Priest, G. (2010), ‘The Logic of the Catuṣkoṭi’, Comparative Philosophy, 1: 24-54, http://www.comparativephilosophy.org/index.php/ComparativePhilosophy/article/view/51.  
Tillemans, T. (2009), ‘How do Mādhyamikas Think? Notes on Jay Garfield, Graham 
Priest and Paraconsistency’, pp. 83-100 of J. L. Garfield, T. Tillemans, and M. 
D’Amato (eds), Pointing at the Moon. Buddhism, Logic, Analytic Philosophy, 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Tsongkhapa (2006). Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (N. Samten and J. Garfield, trans.). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
